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Abstract: The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act [P.L. 111–31] gives the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco products, including placing restrictions on
product composition, sale, and distribution. A complete accounting of the costs and benefits of any tobacco
regulation includes harms from possible illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP): costs of enforcement,
violence, incarceration, etc. Indeed, the law instructs the FDA to take into account the “countervailing
effects” of regulation on public health, “such as the creation of a significant demand for contraband or other
tobacco products that do not meet the requirements.” While the law’s narrow focus on public health may
limit the scope of an inquiry by the FDA compared to a full benefit-cost analysis, aspects of ITTP such as
violence and incarceration have substantial health impacts. Illicit markets in drugs such as cocaine, heroin,
and methamphetamine, not to mention the grand experiment of alcohol Prohibition in the early twentieth
century, illustrate the substantial risks of unwanted side effects of drug prohibition. But taxes, product
limitations, access restrictions, and narrowly defined product bans constitute “lesser prohibitions,” and are
subject to the same kind (if not degree) of risks. All tobacco policymaking should therefore consider ITTP.
This article sets forth a research agenda for the FDA to consider in order to estimate the effects of
contemplated tobacco-product regulation and ITTP. To carry out fully its legislative mandate, the FDA
would have to determine the current size and impacts of ITTP, analyze how these may be expected to
change under new regulations, and look for interdependencies among tobacco-product markets that may
complicate single-product regulation. A more challenging element of the research agenda would be to
develop a better theoretical groundwork for the prediction of the emergence, size, and side effects of illicit
markets. We close with discussion of how the proposed research agenda may lead to insights into other
policy areas as well.
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I.

Introduction
Because tobacco use harms health, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

(TCA) of 2009 1 amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the FDCA) to give the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco products. Such regulation can include
restrictions on the sale and distribution of a tobacco product if deemed appropriate for protection of
public health. While the FDA lacks the authority to ban any broad class of existing tobacco products,
such as cigarettes or cigars, the agency does have the authority to prohibit particular ingredients. The
TCA prohibited cigarettes with “characterizing flavors” other than menthol, and instructed the FDA to
consider extending that ban to menthol cigarettes. 2
A complete accounting of the costs and benefits of tobacco regulation must include assessing
possible unintended consequences. One of the risks involved with restricting access to a product
through regulation is evasion (Marchese, 2004). Evasion reduces the efficacy of regulations and gives
birth to new harms in the form of illicit markets. Illicit trade in tobacco products, hereafter ITTP, creates
its own detrimental impacts on the public weal, including the costs of enforcement and the negative
effects of incarceration and violence (Prieger and Kulick, 2014, 2015; Kulick, Prieger, and Kleiman, 2015).
Indeed, the FDCA instructs the FDA to consider how regulation would affect health risks and benefits to
the population at large, not just to tobacco users. 3 In particular, the law instructs the FDA to take into
account “the countervailing effects of [a proposed] tobacco product standard on the health of

1

Pub. L. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776.

2

While legally the FDA cannot ban tobacco products but instead regulates ingredients, we will loosely refer to the

FDA decisions to “ban” particular products such as mentholated cigarettes, since prohibiting the addition of
menthol to cigarettes effectively removes the product from the licit market.
3

FD&C §387f (d)(1).
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adolescent tobacco users, adult tobacco users, or nontobacco users, such as the creation of a significant
demand for contraband or other tobacco products that do not meet the requirements.” Such a study
can be conducted by the FDA’s own personnel (e.g., the agency’s experts within its Center for Tobacco
Products), by the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee (TPSAC) established by the FDCA, or
by other independent researchers commissioned by the FDA.
While the law’s narrow focus on public health may limit the scope of an inquiry by the FDA
compared to a full benefit-cost analysis, aspects of ITTP such as violence and incarceration (for example)
have substantial health impacts. Illicit markets in drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine,
and those during alcohol Prohibition in the early 20th century, illustrate the substantial risks of unwanted
side effects of drug prohibition. Outright prohibition, however, is not required for ITTP and its pernicious
consequences to occur; regulations restricting access and taxes that increase the price of legal
purchases can be thought of as “lesser prohibitions,” subject to the same kind (if not degree) of risks
(Reuter 2013). A sufficiently high tax is effectively a prohibition. Tobacco policymaking should therefore
consider ITTP, since some of the health benefits of regulation may be offset by enforcement costs and
the negative impacts of ITTP on illicit-market participants and others.
In the spirit of previous research attempting to identify “what we know and what research is
required,” (e.g., Van Walbeek et al., 2013), this article sets forth a research agenda for the FDA to
consider pursuing to investigate the interaction between tobacco-product regulation and ITTP. The
notion that ITTP is entwined with tobacco regulation is not new. Indeed, the TCA lists as one of its goals
“to strengthen legislation against illicit trade in tobacco products.” 4 In its inquiry into possible regulation
of menthol cigarettes, the FDA asked interested parties to comment on whether a ban would lead to a

4

TCA, op. cit., Sec. 3(10).
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significant problem of illicit trade and, if so, what would be the impact on public health. 5 The proposed
research agenda considered here includes determining the current size and impacts of ITTP, analyzing
how they may be expected to change under new regulations, and looking for interdependencies among
tobacco-product markets that may complicate single-product regulation. An additional task, formulating
a model of price, quantity, and violence determination in illicit markets, would be extremely helpful in
providing theoretical grounding for the empirical work. The suggested tasks for research here are not
meant to comprehensively cover all costs and benefits of tobacco-product regulation. Rather, our goal is
to set forth some of the issues related to one potential cost of regulation—an increase in ITTP—that
bear investigation as part of a broader regulatory policymaking process.

II.

A Research Agenda for the FDA
The research agenda is laid out in four parts. The first task, described in section A, involves

developing an understanding of the current ITTP in the United States. The second part of the agenda, in
section B, is to study the likely impacts of additional or stricter tobacco regulation. The third aspect of
the agenda, in section C, is to delve into how the various tobacco-product markets are interrelated, and
how the outcomes from regulating one market depend on regulations in related markets. The final and
most ambitious part of the agenda, proposed in section D, is to improve the theoretical groundwork for
the previous analyses by constructing a model that can predict the characteristics and dimensions of the
illicit market that will arise in the face of a new regulation or tax, or how an existing market will
transform in the face of a change in regulation or taxation. The tasks are summarized in Table 1 and the
relationships among them are depicted in Figure 1.

5

78 Fed. Reg. 44485 (July 24, 2013) Sec. II.C.3.
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Figure 1: Relationships among the regulation, tobacco markets, enforcement, and the proposed
research tasks.

Note: The numbers in the figure refer to the research tasks as enumerated in Table 1.

A.

Assessing the current situation

To be able to analyze prospectively the outcomes following from particular regulations, the FDA
should learn as much as possible about the current state of affairs regarding illicit trade. This effort
should include three tasks: 1) Modeling domestic ITTP overall and by locality; 2) Estimating the costs and
volume of enforcement actions against ITTP; and 3) Examining state-level capacity to prevent the sale of
illicit tobacco.
4
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Table 1: The research tasks in the proposed agenda
No.

Research task

Section of
Article
II.A.1

Summary

Policy relevancy

1

Model ITTP by geography to
determine who is affected

Estimate the current scale of ITTP at the national and
local level. Develop an empirical model linking local
sociodemographic factors to ITTP.
Examine current enforcement actions against ITTP and
their social costs: direct, indirect, and unintended.

ITTP follows from tobacco regulation, and it is
important to be able to model where it is
likely to occur and who will be affected by it.
The social costs of ITTP must be included in
the policy calculus regarding any particular
regulatory action.
Without effective enforcement, additional
regulation may fail to achieve its desired
effects. Effectiveness requires understanding
what works.
Understanding consumer attitudes is crucial
to determining likely responses to new
regulation and hence its efficacy.
Without effective enforcement, additional
regulation may fail to achieve its desired
effects. Effectiveness requires adequate
resources for law-enforcement.
Knowing whether new regulation would spur
illegal important would help inform the
decision as to whether the public interest
would be served.
Consumers’ responses to regulation depend
on their full set of consumption choices, licit
and illicit. Regulatory effectiveness requires
understanding how the results of banning
one product depend on the alternatives
available to consumers.
A model of ITTP that capture the important
quantitative features of the black market
would be invaluable in conducting regulatory
and enforcement simulations.

2

Assess the social costs of ITTP and
enforcement

II.A.2

3

Identify state and local capacity to
enforce bans

II.A.3

Discover which regulatory structures and enforcement
tactics are effective to combat ITTP, and which states
are using them.

4

Survey consumer attitudes toward
ITTP

II.B.1

5

Estimate the enforcement
requirements of a ban

II.B.2

Predict consumer responses to increased regulation by
examining attitudes toward ITTP. Identify mechanisms
for decreasing the social acceptability of ITTP.
Determine how much additional enforcement would
be required to blunt the growth of ITTP following new
regulation.

6

Analyze the risks from the import
market for illicit product

II.B.3

Identify the organizations (DTOs, TCOs) likely to enter
into ITTP. Examine the ramifications for violence,
border control, and other illicit activities.

7

Investigate policy-relevant
interdependencies among tobacco
products

II.C

Understand interactions among a proposed regulation
and all tobacco and related products, not just the one
targeted by the new rule.

8

Develop a theoretical framework

II.D

Build a unified model of ITTP to predict market value,
conduct, and responses to enforcement.

5
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1.

Model ITTP by geography to determine who is affected

The first task is to learn about the scale and local determinants of ITTP. A new ban on a product would
create a new set of opportunities for ITTP. Estimating the magnitude of the unintended consequences of
a ban therefore requires understanding the current extent and costs of ITTP and anti-ITTP enforcement.
Without knowing the magnitude of ITTP, it is impossible to make the best decisions about which
regulations work best from an encompassing social perspective. This task addresses the extent and
location of ITTP; the following task outlined in section 2 concerns the costs of ITTP and enforcement.
Taxation, regulation, and enforcement efforts influence the level of illicit activity. Given that
taxation and regulation vary among locations, illicit activity is not uniform across the nation. For
example, communities along borders with high differentials in taxation are likely to be affected more by
ITTP due to cross border product flows (Chiou and Muehlegger, 2008; Lovenheim, 2008; Harding et al.,
2012). The research task here, therefore, is to map what domestic ITTP looks like at various levels of
geography, from the national level down to the state, local, and neighborhood levels. Then, illicit
tobacco use can be mapped by jurisdictions as a function of taxation, regulation, and proximity to other
higher- or lower-tax states to estimate illicit market share of each state. Finally, to put a human face on
the impacts of tobacco regulation and ITTP, the influence of a range of socioeconomic factors on the use
and prevalence of illicit tobacco can be investigated. This analysis facilitates better understanding of the
distribution of the burdens of illicit tobacco markets and of enforcement against them as a consequence
of a ban on particular tobacco products.
a)

Background

A complete analysis of the US market for illicit tobacco has not been performed. Frequently quoted
figures (e.g., Niquette and Deprez, 2014) suggest that ITTP cost $5 billion in lost state and federal tax
revenues in 2010 and $7 to $10 billion in 2014. Accurately describing ITTP is difficult for all the reasons
6
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that observing any illicit activity is difficult: market participants try to hide, may not be available for
interview, and have reasons not to be frank in responding to questions. However, it is clear that ITTP in
the United States is substantial, with as much as one-fifth of cigarettes smoked in the United States not
taxed in the same state where they are consumed (Fix et al., 2014). 6 ITTP is substantial in part because it
offers high illicit rewards for relatively low risk compared to other crime (GAO, 2012). Von Lampe, Kurti,
and Bae (2014) identify several methods of illicit cigarette supply, including bootlegging (legal
purchasing in low-tax jurisdictions for transport and resale in high-tax areas), smuggling (trafficking in
untaxed product), and counterfeiting. Any of these can operate both within and across national borders.
State-by-state policy differences have led to different taxation policies even in neighboring
states, creating tax differentials across state borders and thus the conditions for profitable smuggling.
Smugglers can buy cheap licit product in a low-tax state for illegal resale in a high-tax state; less
commonly, smugglers deal in entirely illicit products (i.e., produced without proper licensing or taxation,
and perhaps also fraudulently branded) imported from overseas or produced domestically. 7 Accordingly
the social consequences of illicit tobacco are felt more acutely in some specific geographic regions than
in others. Apart from geography, the use of illicit tobacco and its negative social consequences
disproportionately affect certain socioeconomic communities more than others (Delva et al., 2005;
Kanjilal et al., 2006).

6

Not every such cigarette is illicit, because it is not illegal to purchase a pack of cigarettes in one state and travel to

another state where the pack is consumed. The volume of non-tax-paid cigarettes in many jurisdictions swamps
any such casual behavior, however.
7

The incidence of such counterfeit or unbranded product is much higher in many foreign countries.
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b)

Data collection and analysis

Existing studies address the nature and extent of ITTP in the United States (Cummings,
Pechacek, and Shopland, 1994; Shelley et al., 2007; Merriman, 2010; Kurti et al., 2013; Fix et al., 2014)
and abroad (Wilson et al., 2009; Joossens et al., 2014). These might prove useful in identifying specific
areas meriting more detailed investigation. There do not appear to be large-scale studies modeling the
illicit market at the levels proposed here.
Many methods of gathering data can be used as inputs for a model of domestic illicit tobacco
use in geographic detail. These include novel use of existing large-scale surveys, new surveys, the
collection of discarded packs, interviews of law-enforcement agencies, and ethnographic studies. Largescale traditional surveys that ask about where cigarettes are purchased include the International
Tobacco Control (ITC) Project surveys (Guindon et al., 2014) and the TUS-CPS (Chiou and Muehlegger,
2008; Lovenheim, 2008; DeCicca, Kenkel, and Liu, 2013). To augment existing estimates of the size of the
illicit tobacco market, surveys of consumers and analysis of discarded cigarette packs (Lakhdar, 2008;
Wilson et al., 2009; Merriman, 2010; Davis et al., 2014; Stoklosa and Ross, 2014; Wherry et al., 2014) can
be performed. For discarded-pack studies, researchers choose a defined geographic area, collect littered
cigarette butts or packs, and examine them for tax stamps and other evidence of legality. Lawenforcement officials currently working tobacco cases are an important potential source of “thick,”
detailed knowledge about trafficking patterns, including geographic distribution and the demographics
of buyers and sellers. Traffickers can also be surveyed, perhaps with ethnographic techniques.
Ethnographic approaches provide information about the norms, values, and practices of the subcultures
that engage in illicit activity. The qualitative knowledge gained can then inform the creation of data-

8
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collection techniques. Further estimates of the size of ITTP can be based on comparison of tax-paid sales
with survey and manufacturing data for total domestic sales and production. 8
Government agencies with existing interests, programs, and data collection regarding the
tobacco industry, enforcement, or ITTP are likely candidates to partner in the research task. Such
agencies include the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), ATF, and
TTB. Nonprofits such as the American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation and the Mackinac Center for
Public Policy may also be able to contribute data, expertise, or other support for the research. Industry
stakeholders, such as tobacco companies whose brand integrity divisions work extensively with lawenforcement agencies involved with ITTP, may be able to provide additional data on ITTP for analysis.
With data in hand, econometric modeling can link the magnitude of ITTP in a state or local area
to the various determinants discussed above. Explanatory factors in the analysis can include area
characteristics such as the socio-demographic composition of the neighborhoods, the proximity to
lower-tax jurisdictions, and the nature of local prohibitions or taxes currently in place. The estimated
models can then be used to investigate questions such as what the impacts of ITTP on the community
are expected to be, for a community with certain characteristics. If enough data can be collected to
accurately estimate the proposed relationship between the explanatory factors and the outcomes, then
the models will allow valid out-of-sample prediction for other communities. Such granular geographic
analysis can then be aggregated to the state and national level.
2.

Assess the social costs of ITTP and enforcement

The next task is to examine the social costs of ITTP and to conduct surveys of present
enforcement actions. Among the goals here are to categorize, enumerate, and examine trends in

8

The various options to collect data for this research task are described in more detail in the report on which this

article is based (Kleiman, Prieger, and Kulick, 2015).
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enforcement actions against ITTP, as well as to examine unintended social costs such as incidents of
violence. Understanding the costs of ITTP and anti-ITTP enforcement allows estimation of the level of
additional enforcement that might be required and the additional social costs of ITTP and enforcement
that such a ban would generate.
a)

Background

At the federal level, the Jenkins Act, the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act (CCTA), the PACT
Act, and the TCA all address ITTP. 9 States and localities have enacted a patchwork of laws and
regulations. However, the enforcement effort is not currently coordinated or even well measured.
Jurisdiction is spread among multiple federal agencies as well as states, counties, and municipalities;
ultimately different states and local jurisdictions enforce tobacco regulation on their own terms.
ITTP costs states lost tax revenue from licit trade (Goolsbee, Lovenheim, and Slemrod, 2010).
Illegal activity also generates additional social costs: increased health risks from consuming unregulated
or counterfeit products, and increased levels of smoking among youths whose typically lower disposable
incomes often prevent them from purchasing legal, taxed tobacco. Other social costs of ITTP to be
investigated include law-enforcement costs; crime-related violence; revenue for criminal organizations;
and damage to market participants and their families and neighbors from arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration.
b)

Data collection and analysis

There are no comprehensive quantitative studies of the costs of enforcement or types of
enforcement actions against ITTP. The study of anti-ITTP enforcement should have two goals: measuring

9

Jenkins Act: 5 U.S.C. §375-378; CCTA: 18 U.S.C. 2341-2346; PACT (Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking) Act: 5 U.S.C.

§376; FSP&TCA: 21 U.S.C. §301.
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enforcement activities and estimating their budgetary and social costs. Enumerations include the
number of dedicated personnel, investigative actions, arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and seizures of
contraband and other assets. Measurements include budgetary cost, the number of cigarettes seized,
the value of other assets seized, and person-days or person-years served in jail or prison. The
confidentiality of enforcement plans and records complicates efforts at gathering data. Furthermore,
budgets and activity counts for enforcement efforts against ITTP are hard to disentangle from agencies’
other expenditures and activities.
Only a few studies attempt to account for the social costs of crime and violence associated with
ITTP (Collins and Lapsley, 2008; Caneppele, Savona, and Aziani, 2013), and fewer still are specific to the
United States (Reuter and Majmundar, 2015). Efforts at data collection should begin with the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
(TTB). Customs and Border Protection (CBP) should have data on tobacco seizures. The Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security will have some information about ITTP and
anti-ITTP enforcement where it intersects with concerns about organized crime and terrorism. The
Executive Office for US Attorneys collects budget and activity data for the 94 federal prosecutors’
offices, and might be able to separate out ITTP cases. State and local enforcement activity may well
constitute the bulk of total anti-ITTP enforcement, since state and local activity accounts for
approximately 85 percent of total US law-enforcement effort (Kyckelhahn, 2014). Stratified sampling of
state and local authorities, of the sort routinely undertaken by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, could
provide useful data.
To estimate the harms inflicted by enforcement on offenders and others, and the other social
damage done by ITTP, a careful accounting of the many social costs is required. Building a range of
reasonable estimates for the size of the illicit tobacco market can follow methods of the social11
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accounting exercises for the economic impacts of illegal tobacco or drugs (e.g., Caputo and Ostrom,
2006; Collins and Lapsley, 2008; Joossens et al., 2010). Care needs to be taken to ensure that only the
incremental costs of illicit tobacco are included. Costs to consider, inter alia, include estimates of the
social costs of crimes attributable to ITTP, the incremental harm to health from counterfeit illicit tobacco
products (which Stephens, Calder, and Newton (2005) show can be more dangerous than licit product),
the forgone productivity of the incarcerated, and other social costs. Since Daudelin, Soiffer, and Willows
(2013) warn that participation in ITTP can lead to more involvement in other illegal activities, spillovers
to other areas of crime need to be considered.
3.

Identify state and local capacity to enforce bans

The capacity of each state to prevent the sale of a tobacco product under consideration for a
ban is important to know in advance of regulation. Thus, it is instructive to identify which regulatory
structures and enforcement tactics have proven valuable in various jurisdictions and what is the capacity
to take on further enforcement responsibility under a new ban. Constraints in enforcement ability and
resources will affect the market growth of ITTP that is anticipated to occur under a new ban on a
tobacco product.
Many states and localities are unprepared to effectively carry out enforcement against ITTP;
ignoring those deficiencies might lead to dramatic underestimates of the social costs of a specific
product ban. A study of enforcement capacity is also important for improving the outcomes of a ban.
Poorly equipped jurisdictions can be identified and informed of ways to improve controls and effective
performers can be offered as examples to others.
a)

Background

By influencing the supply side, enforcement can nudge consumers away from illicit purchases
with increased prices and search times. Enforcement also provides morality cues to law-abiding citizenry
12
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on the demand side. Thus, adequate enforcement capacity is essential to combating ITTP. However, the
states’ management of their tobacco-control efforts is far from uniform. States have varying regulatory
structures for collecting tobacco taxes; some are easier to evade than others. For instance, California has
implemented a new tax stamp and streamlined processes for sanctions against license holders, which
the state claims have dramatically increased its ability to prevent and punish resale of illicit tobacco.
There is also variation at the level of cities and counties. Only a select few police or sheriff’s
departments have officers or squads targeted to detecting counterfeit or tax-evaded products, tobacco
included.
b)

Data collection and analysis

The published literature does not contain a comprehensive review of state- or local-level
regulatory and enforcement capacity, nor of the effectiveness of such efforts. Some of the extant
literature discusses the strategies available to enforcement agencies seeking to limit ITTP (CTFK, 2014).
DiFranza (2005) discusses the cost-effectiveness of various states’ enforcement practices regarding
limiting youth access to tobacco. However, a comprehensive study evaluating the cost effectiveness of
specific actions combatting ITTP has yet to be performed. Indeed, there seems to be a dearth of highquality academic research that addresses the deficiencies and variations in the capacities of jurisdictions
to enforce laws against ITTP.
Data sources for the proposed project can begin with the scant literature detailing enforcement
activities and related costs (Alderman, 2012). Then, agencies in each state with responsibilities
encompassing ITTP can be identified. Such agencies include taxation authorities, state police, and offices
of attorneys general. A sample of local police and sheriff’s offices can be contacted and inquiry made
about current commitments to combating ITTP (e.g., budget, units, or employees designated to relevant
areas) and about policies and processes regarding to detection or reporting. Local agencies can also be
13
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polled as to their willingness and ability to initiate or ramp up enforcement activities related to ITTP in
the event of a new ban or other regulations on a particular tobacco product.
The surveys and inquiries should determine which states have the following:
●

Difficult-to-counterfeit tax stamp systems;

●

Mandatory frequent inspections of retailers;

●

Effective case processing and prosecution of illicit-tobacco offenses;

●

Effective sanctions for detected violations in terms of deterrence and incapacitation;

●

Effective anti-corruption measures with regard to enforcement of tobacco regulations and
taxes;

●

Capacity for demand reduction, including smoking-cessation campaigns; and

●

Any other measures that reduce ITTP.

To identify the effectiveness of various regulatory structures and enforcement tactics,
interviewing those responsible for implementing or overseeing programs, including agency personnel
and law enforcement, is a natural place to start. Possible partners in the research include ATF, TTB, the
US Government Accountability Office (GAO), and state and local tax-enforcement agencies, both in low
and high cigarette-tax states. The partners could help identify common obstacles and prerequisites for
success. It is important to scrutinize the components of jurisdictional efforts that have managed to keep
illicit tobacco and other black markets under control (Allen, 2012). Particular attention should be paid to
programs that have managed to minimize deleterious impacts on public safety.

B.

Examining the impacts of banning a tobacco product

After learning about the current ITTP and enforcement situation, the FDA should examine the
likely impacts of banning a tobacco product. This can include three tasks: 1) Discovering consumer
attitudes toward illicit tobacco products and likely responses to banning a particular product; 2)
14
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estimating the enforcement requirements of a specific product ban at state and local levels; and 3)
analyzing the risks of a substantial import market for illicit tobacco product in the face of a ban.
1.

Survey consumer attitudes toward ITTP

Consumers’ attitudes concerning the purchase of illicit tobacco products are an important part
of the policy analysis of a proposed ban, since they determine the likely extent of the resulting illicit
activity. In addition to predicting effects on the illicit tobacco market, understanding social attitudes and
their relationship to purchasing patterns might help to identify mechanisms for decreasing the social
acceptability of illicit tobacco distribution and consumption.
a)

Background

Despite the prevalence of tobacco consumption in the United States, relatively little is known
regarding users’ attitudes toward the illicit market for tobacco. Underlying attitudes toward illicit
tobacco consumption likely vary across various socio-economic and demographic factors. It is known,
however, that attitudes are not uniform. For example, a quarter of menthol smokers who were surveyed
in a recent study claimed that they would seek out illicit menthol cigarettes in the face of a ban
(O’Connor et al., 2012). It is unclear how much risk would be required to dissuade illicit purchases, or
what illicit demand would be at various possible prices. This segment of the research agenda updates
and improves upon existing efforts in this area (e.g., O’Connor et al., 2012).
b)

Data collection and analysis

Several studies involve eliciting opinions from smokers and others about contraband, counterfeit, and
otherwise illicit tobacco products (Shelley et al., 2007; Moodie, Mackintosh, and West, 2010; Pellegrini,
Fry, and Aitken, 2011; Moodie, Hastings, and Joossens, 2012; Stead et al., 2013; Wackowski, Manderski,
and Delnevo, 2014). Many of these studies were conducted on subjects outside the United States, which
15
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limits their usefulness for present purposes. Nevertheless, studies from other countries are suggestive.
Research in the U.K., for example, finds that working-class communities hold positive attitudes toward
illicit cigarette distribution. Respondents thought that distributors provided a valuable service, licit
cigarettes were unreasonably expensive, resentment of government rationalizes illicit cigarette use, and
smuggling is an everyday practice with social reinforcement (Moodie, Mackintosh, and West, 2010).
Attitudes towards illicit tobacco products can be assessed through surveys and interviews. How
users of particular tobacco products would respond to a ban has been estimated by surveys and
modeling based on econometric studies of the price responsiveness of demand. For example, response
to a ban on menthol cigarettes is examined by Tauras et al. (2010), Winickoff et al. (2011), O’Connor et
al. (2012), and Pearson et al. (2012). However, these results remain speculative.
The research here assesses the lengths to which tobacco users would be willing to go when
looking for illicit product, as well as the relationship of such willingness to local attitudes about ITTP.
Distinctions between specific modes of supply or illicit product may also be important. For example,
consumers are not likely to view genuine but smuggled product the same as counterfeit product. In
particular, the research should attempt to determine attitudes about illicit sales; tax increases, sale and
use restrictions, and bans; actions taken by government, law enforcement, and tobacco companies to
limit the illicit market and regulate tobacco; social acceptance of illicit use; and tradeoffs between price,
risk, and product quality.
In addition to the qualitative insights such surveying can yield, well-developed methods in the
econometric literature can uncover underlying preference relationships from revealed and stated
preference data (Morikawa, Ben-Akiva, and McFadden, 2002), which can then be used to determine
likely responses to hypothetical regulatory changes. Discrete-choice experiments (an example of
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conjoint analysis and contingent valuation) 10 can be conducted with subjects to estimate preferences for
alternatives to licit product in the event of a ban. The existing literature provides a useful starting place
(Flach and Diener, 2004; Ida and Goto, 2009).
2.

Estimate the enforcement requirements of a ban

The task set forth in section A.3 examines current capability and practice in enforcement against
ITTP. However, under stricter regulation or new bans, additional law enforcement would be needed. It is
therefore necessary to determine how much enforcement would be required to blunt the growth of
illicit sales. This research task also includes examination of the effects and costs of these potential
changes in state and local law enforcement.
a)

Background

Given that a ban would increase the volume of illicit sales activity, it would increase the
workload of local and state law enforcement. The extent of that increase has not been estimated.
Various law-enforcement activities should be taken into account when understanding the costs and
effects of a ban. These include general street enforcement by non-specialized police units; investigations
of large-scale distributors by specialized units; and the costs of prosecution and punishment for
violators. Additionally, the costs of training and equipment, as well as coordination across enforcement
agencies, should be included.
While interception of illicit shipments entering the United States (interdiction) is mostly handled
by the Coast Guard, CBP, and Department of Defense, state and local law enforcement are burdened
with monitoring distribution patterns within US borders, including in areas adjacent to borders and

10

See Agarwal et al. (2014) for an overview of conjoint analysis and seminal citations. Carson (2012) provides a

relatively nontechnical discussion of contingent-valuation analysis and the issues involved.
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surrounding Indian reservations. In addition, most enforcement efforts to combat the availability of illicit
drugs are not interdiction efforts but instead require local resources.
b)

Data collection and analysis

There appear to be no current efforts to estimate the enforcement requirements of increased
tobacco regulation. An analysis of the problem from the demand side starts by estimating the likely
growth in illicit market activity in the absence of any increase in enforcement. Thus, this research task
can draw upon the research concerning the behavior of current consumers of tobacco to be performed
in section A.1 above. For example, at various price points, what fraction of consumers would be willing
to purchase illicit product as opposed to quitting use or switching to other tobacco products?
The simplest next step is to compare the likely size of the post-ban illicit market with the
estimated size of the current illicit market, and assume that enforcement would have to scale up
proportionately to market size in order to maintain the current level of discouragement of illicit activity.
This requires detailed data collection and analysis to estimate the level and costs of current
enforcement efforts, as in the task described in section A.2 above. A more ambitious approach uses the
“risks and prices” analysis (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986) to compute the level of additional enforcement
required to shrink the illicit market back to its current size, given the additional demand from users of
the banned product switching from licit to illicit purchase. Even more ambitious is to model the process
dynamically, incorporating the range of positive feedbacks characteristic of illicit markets (Kleiman and
Kilmer 2009; Prieger and Kulick, 2015).
Another portion of the analysis can model the effects of constraints on enforcement capacity
and effectiveness in determining the size and social costs of ITTP. This part of the analysis begins with
simulating the effects of different regulatory structures and enforcement practices and resources on the
extent of the illicit market. Next, the effect on illicit markets of a ban can be estimated, after accounting
18
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for constraints on enforcement. Computation of alternative scenarios in which enforcement agencies
adopt more effective regulatory structures and practices concludes this part of the research.
3.

Analyze the risks from the import market for illicit product

The United States risks developing a substantial import market for illicit tobacco if the FDA bans
a particular tobacco product. To assess how large a problem importation of illicit product might be, it is
necessary to identify the organizations likely to enter into the trade and to examine the ramifications for
violence, border control, and other illicit activities. Such considerations will inform the decision as to
whether heightened regulation of tobacco would serve the public interest.
a)

Background

As discussed above, the substantial ITTP in the United States consists primarily of cigarettes
legally produced domestically and then smuggled across state borders. Compared to elsewhere in the
world, ITTP in cigarettes produced abroad is relatively rare. This is not to say that illicit importation is
unknown; recently the US DOJ convicted an Indian citizen of importing millions of counterfeit Newport
cigarettes from India into Miami (USDOJ, 2015). 11 In contrast to the United States, a large export trade
in illicit tobacco products already exists within Latin America. In Paraguay, up to 90 percent of their 47
billion annually produced cigarettes are exported internationally (Guevara, Rehnfeldt, and Soares,
2009); large criminal organizations transport illicit tobacco through neighboring countries (Allen, 2011;
Interpol, 2014). A ban on a tobacco product might offer that traffic a foothold in the United States, and
international smuggling could become the primary source of illicit product.

11

The scale of the operation was large, involving 53,740 cartons of fake Newport cigarettes at a black-market

wholesale price of about $0.5M and a street value of over $1M (USDOJ, 2015). An equal number of legitimate
Newport cigarettes would sell for about $1.8M in Florida.
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Border security alone cannot stop the trade. Already, billions of dollars of drugs are trafficked
across the Mexican border into the United States; a tobacco-related ban could bring many more. If even
a small portion of current tobacco users were to turn to the black market for imported goods, the
potential revenues would likely draw interest from some DTOs, in addition to expanding existing crossborder smuggling networks for tobacco (Daudelin, Soiffer, and Willows, 2013). The effects of a larger
trade in imported illicit tobacco products would be far-reaching, given the disorder currently wreaked by
Mexican DTOs (Beittel, 2009). The larger of these operations engage in a considerable amount of
violence, primarily within Mexico, and the resulting bloodshed (estimated at more than 10,000 deaths
per year since 2006) is now devastating parts of that country.
b)

Data collection and analysis

Given the increase in ITTP in response to a proposed ban estimated under the research tasks
outlined above, the anticipated reactions by DTOs and other transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)
can be investigated. To investigate profitable trafficking routes and business models likely to be
employed, the literature and available data on DTOs can be reviewed (Natarajan, 2000, 2006; L’Hoiry,
2013; Lyman, 2015). Which organizations are likely to supply demand for illicit product? DTOs are
unlikely to enter the trade unless revenues are sufficiently large. However, the revenue requirements
for profitability are lower for well-established smuggling networks than they would be for a de novo
venture. The former enjoy the advantage of economies of scope, since they have already sunk
investments in their infrastructure (Daudelin, Soiffer, and Willows, 2013).
Apart from revenue, costs also figure into the potential profits of DTOs. Costs of illicit suppliers
include the cost of production, the cost of labor for distribution, the opportunity costs of capital
employed in production and distribution, and the costs of related supplies and proprietors’ incomes
(whether paid in cash or imputed from managers’ opportunity costs) (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986).
20
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Additional costs include the expected value of losses to enforcement (e.g., seizures). Enforcement data
from comparable illicit markets might serve as a model for the latter costs. The remaining profit should
be compared to other markets and enforcement data to determine whether an illicit market in a banned
tobacco product would be lucrative for small and large-scale producers and distributors.
Even if the trade is profitable in the abstract, it is not clear which organizations would enter and
compete in that market. Yet some organizations are more dangerous than others. Which organizations
are best fit to compete? What are the feasible levels of imported tobacco from Mexico, and at what
prices? How would Mexican organizations fare against competition from other potential exporters, such
as China or against diversions from Indian reservations? How would the existing domestic infrastructure
for interstate smuggling shape international trafficking? All these questions should be investigated.
Finally, for policy analysis, expected outcomes as outlined above can be compared under alternative
policy formations (e.g., complete ban with or without bans on next-best substitute tobacco products,
heavy taxation instead of a ban, etc.).
In addition to the worries about DTOs becoming involved with ITTP is the link between ITTP and
funding for terrorism. The U.S. Congress found that ITTP is “linked to organized crime and terrorist
groups.” 12 Terrorist organizations consider illicit tobacco a lucrative source of income. Organizations
known or strongly suspected to benefit from ITTP include Hamas, Hezbollah, the Taliban, al Qaeda, and
the IRA (Billingslea, 2004; Shelley and Melzer, 2008; Brady, 2013). 13
Finally, related to the question of importation is the sourcing of tobacco from Native American
reservations in the U.S. and First Nations reserves in Canada, some of which straddle the border.

12

Public Law 111-31, Div. A, sec. 2 (35).

13

However, von Lampe (2011) states that “the involvement of terrorist groups who trade in illegal cigarettes to

raise funds … seems to be the exception rather than the rule,” at least in Europe, where ITTP is conducted
primarily by individuals without previous criminal records instead of known criminals.
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Reservations pose a unique problem for tobacco consumption, taxation, and the cross-border transit of
tobacco (Daudelin, Soiffer, and Willows, 2013). Even setting aside the aspect of international smuggling,
reservations create complications regarding tobacco trade. American Indians are not exempt from
paying duties for commercial trading goods when crossing reservation borders. Nevertheless, cigarette
production plants operate out of Indian reservations, providing duty-free cigarettes that are sold both to
onsite consumers and to distributors who resell throughout other areas, sometimes illegally across
borders (Kelton and Givel, 2008).

C.

Investigating policy-relevant interdependencies among tobacco
products

In the face of a ban on one particular tobacco product, interactions between that and other
tobacco products are important to understand. For an example, consider traditional and electronic
cigarettes (e-cigarettes). A ban on a type of cigarette (for example, menthols) will present users with a
restricted set of choices. Some of those smokers will quit entirely, others will turn to menthols available
from the black market, others might switch to non-menthol cigarettes, and others still might switch to
menthol e-cigarettes. The advantage of the latter option is reduced rates of traditional-cigarette use and
black- market activity, while the disadvantage is a lower rate of complete cessation. The impacts—in
either direction—are largest if e-cigarettes remain widely available and allowable to use. Thus the policy
decision to ban the one product is inextricably entwined with the question of how to regulate the other.
Existing policy-relevant estimates of cross-price elasticities between tobacco-related products include
examinations of interdependencies between demand for cigarettes and nicotine replacement therapy
(Chandra, Gitchell, and Shiffman, 2011), cigarettes and e-cigarettes (Huang, Tauras, and Chaloupka,
2014), and menthol and non-menthol cigarettes (Tauras et al., 2010).
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These considerations affect each of the research tasks outlined above. For example, when
examining the risks from the import market for banned product, clearly the product scope of the ban is
important. Continuing with the example of e-cigarettes: if allowed, they might steal demand away from
illegal imports of the traditional product, but only if e-cigarettes turn out to be substitutes in demand for
traditional cigarettes rather than complements. Those factors could be important and should be
included in the modeling exercises above as different scenarios.

D.

Developing a theoretical framework

There is now a substantial literature on ITTP, along with an even more extensive literature on
illicit drug markets and other illicit markets. Considerable attention has been paid to illicit markets and
the informal economy in the fields of economics, public policy, criminology, ethnography, and economic
sociology (Schelling, 1971; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986; van Ours and Pudney, 2006; Beckert and
Wehinger, 2013; Prieger and Kulick, 2014, 2015). Nevertheless, this body of research is of only limited
use to policymakers contemplating specific policy changes. Simply put, no existing model predicts the
form and scale of illicit markets as a function of policies and circumstances.
Data about illicit markets are so imperfect as to make estimation extraordinarily difficult and
prediction virtually impossible (Manski et al., 2001). For example, the estimated inflation-corrected
dollar volume in the illicit cocaine market has roughly halved since 1992, while expenditure in the illicit
cannabis market is more than two and a half times what it was; 14 neither of those changes was
predicted, and there exists no retrospective analysis providing a convincing causal explanation. The

14

The estimate for cannabis is expenditure of $11.5 billion in 1992 (Rhodes, Langenbahn, Kling, and Scheiman,

1997) and $40.8 billion in 2010 (Kilmer et al., 2014). Corrected for inflation, expenditure on marijuana thus grew by
160%. For cocaine, the same sources estimate expenditure of $41.7 billion in 1992 and $28.3 billion in 2010. The
latter figure is half the former figure in real terms.
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desideratum for policymaking would be a well-developed theory capable of predicting quantitatively
how changes in laws or enforcement efforts would affect market scale and the conduct of market
participants. Here we sketch out what such a theory might entail. Note that this research task is not
labeled in Figure 1, since it encompasses every aspect of the illicit trade ecosystem.
1.

Background

Simple analyses predict that increased enforcement against illicit markets should drive prices up,
and yet the ramping up of the “War on Drugs” in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s showed that
paradoxical outcomes are possible. That period saw greatly increased enforcement effort but also
dramatically falling street prices of cocaine and heroin. 15 That so much enforcement effort was
coincident with sharply falling prices is therefore a puzzle. Although some ex-post theoretical modeling
suggests reasons for why increased enforcement might lead to lower prices, 16 some of the modeling
efforts are ad hoc, and are often finely tailored to particular features in specific markets, and overall
largely unconvincing as uncovering the primary mechanisms driving market outcomes.
Apart from economics, interdisciplinary work on illicit markets, yielding insights from
psychology, criminology, sociology, ethnography, and other fields, can help inform the study of
preference formation toward illicit goods (Ritter, 2006; von Lampe, 2006; Beckert and Wehinger, 2013).
Similarly, careful study of supply conditions can help predict what the costs of supply are likely to be
(Reuter and Kleiman, 1986; Hawken, 2013). A complicating factor in the analysis of illicit markets is the
presence of positive-feedback effects in illicit activity (Kleiman and Kilmer, 2009; Prieger and Kulick,

15

Cocaine prices for small users fell from about $450 per gram in 1981 to below $200 by 1994. Prices remained

low until 2007, when they began to rise again. Heroin prices slid through the 1990s. From 1981 to 1998, annual
federal expenditures aimed at reducing the use of illegal drugs through the criminal-justice system, interdiction,
and intelligence increased almost seven-fold. See Prieger and Kulick (2015) for sources.
16

See Prieger and Kulick (2015) for references.
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2015). With bandwagon effects on the supply side, outcomes can be “tipped” from high- to lowviolation equilibria depending on the likelihood of punishment and on the employment of dynamically
concentrated sanctions. This heightens the need to coordinate planned regulatory activity with
enforcement agencies.
2.

Data collection and analysis

While there is no existing unified theory of value determination in illicit markets, research from
many different disciplines is germane (Ritter, 2006; von Lampe, 2005, 2006). There are many “hard”
analyses using the tools of economic theory and econometrics of illicit drug and tobacco markets
(Becker, Murphy, and Grossman, 2006; Prieger and Kulick, 2014, 2015). Methods from many other
disciplines can be brought to bear usefully on the determination of value in illicit markets and its
relationship to effective enforcement strategy. Elements of a mixed-methods approach can include the
emerging behavioral-economics research linking pharmacological, environmental, and economic factors
that contribute to consumption of illicit drugs (Hursh et al., 2005; Caulkins and MacCoun, 2005),
ethnographic studies (Natarajan and Belanger, 1998; May and Hough, 2004), and surveys. Given the
fundamentals of the market and assumed behavior of participants, economic analysis can be employed
to model and predict the magnitudes of prices, quantity, revenue, and profit in an illicit market.
Quantitative analysis can also be used to model the relationship between these market
outcomes and the unintended negative consequences of crime, violence, the social aspects of
criminalization, etc. Gruenewald et al. (2006) studied the specific empirical relationships between
market and demographic characteristics and crime. Sociological aspects of organized crime related to
illicit markets, including the aspect of ethnic homogeneity of criminal networks, have been addressed in
the “social embeddedness” literature (Kleemans and van de Bunt, 1999; von Lampe, 2002; McIllwain,
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2004). The market information and the links to negative consequences can then be used to determine
the optimal law-enforcement effort against the illicit market.
Modeling violence in ITTP is also an important aspect of this research task. Unable to resolve
disputes in the courts, participants may turn to bloodier methods of dispute resolution. Systematic
reviews of the empirical literature show that nearly all studies find evidence of an adverse impact of
drug-law enforcement on levels of violence (Werb et al., 2011; Kulick, Prieger, and Kleiman, 2015).
Marginal increases in enforcement efforts may tend to increase violence, as illustrated by the
enforcement crackdown against the major Mexican drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) since 2006, the
crack markets in many US cities in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the theoretical analyses of Prieger and
Kulick (2014, 2015). Intensifying enforcement can increase the risk of getting caught for any given
pattern of criminal activity. But insofar as the result is to increase prices, and insofar as demand is
relatively inelastic, the result will be to increase total revenue while reducing the number of market
participants, thus increasing the rewards for successful dealing. 17 Moreover, individuals and
organizations specializing in violence may face less enforcement risk than their competitors because
they can intimidate potential witnesses. Thus, while violence provides one justification for increased
enforcement efforts, aggressive enforcement may on balance worsen instead of ameliorate the violence
problem.
Given a ban on a particular tobacco product, then, does there exist a way to enforce that would
uphold the ban without creating a risk of substantial violence in the resulting illicit market? This
question cannot be answered on purely theoretical grounds. Some detailed quantitative modeling,

17

See Prieger and Kulick (2015) for the precise economic conditions under which additional enforcement leads to

greater revenue.
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informed by the interviews with enforcement officials and traffickers that compose parts of the other
research tasks, would be required to make even an informed guess.

III.

Conclusion
While the proposed research agenda covers only one aspect of the decision to regulate

tobacco—illicit trade and its consequences—it is an important part of the overall decision-making
process. Furthermore, despite voluminous research on ITTP, it appears that the topic falls into a blind
spot of the FDA. The experience of the FDA’s inquiry into menthol cigarettes forms a case to illustrate
this.
The FDA commissioned its Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee (TPSAC) to evaluate
the public-health impacts of menthol in cigarettes, as required by the TCA. TPSAC reviewed the evidence
on whether menthol contributed to smoking initiation, addiction, or harmfulness. The Committee gave
very little consideration to the question of illicit markets, though it acknowledged that there exists a
potential for contraband menthol cigarettes. Subsequently, the courts prohibited the FDA from using
the TPSAC report, ruling that several members of the Committee had financial conflicts of interest. 18
Now the FDA must reconstitute the TPSAC committee, so that it can again work to produce the required
report. A second effort at the TPSAC report provides an opportunity for improvement. The initial report
failed to consider all aspects of the Congressional mandate to base regulation on “the risks and benefits
to the population as a whole, including users and nonusers of the tobacco product.” Merely because the

18

The conflicts of interest were on the part of the tobacco control side, not the tobacco industry. Three TPSAC

members stood to gain financially, through their connections with pharmaceutical companies that make smokingcessation products, from the potentially greater demand for such products following stricter tobacco regulation
(Lorillard Inc. et al. v. United States Food and Drug Administration, No. 11-440, July 21, 2014). An appeal of the
decision is pending before the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit.
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social consequences of ITTP are unintended does not mean that they should be ignored in the policy
calculus.
The TPSAC report pleaded that “the need to make uncertain assumptions as to the nature and
functioning of such a black market” meant that the size and social harms from ITTP “cannot be readily
estimated” (Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee, 2011, p. 229). The report’s authors can
hardly be blamed for that conclusion. The current research literature does not provide sufficient
guidance as to many of the key unknowns to allow a responsible estimate. TPSAC recommended the
FDA to consult with experts qualified to carry out the analysis relevant to any actions taken in response
to the report. If the FDA is to carry out that mandate, then, it faces the need to conduct or commission
new research and analysis. The research agenda identified here would generate a clearer answer to
questions about the illicit-market effects of banning a tobacco product.
The agenda set forth here is aimed specifically at understanding the countervailing effects of
tobacco regulation, but the results of the proposed research would be of indirect benefit to other areas
of policy as well. Illicit trade occurs in drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin and
otherwise licit pharmaceuticals that are diverted, illegally resold or imported, or counterfeited. Outside
of the realm of drug policy, other examples of illicit trade include counterfeit luxury goods and music
and video piracy, to name just a few. Some of the research tasks, when performed for ITTP, would
provide templates for analyzing similar issues in these other markets. For example, whether the good is
tobacco, illegally procured prescriptions drugs, or pirated music, in principle if the required data were
available the same modeling that links observed attributes of a local area to the scale and form of ITTP
(task 1) can be applied to other illicit activity. Estimating the empirical relationships between the local
sociodemographic factors and the illegal behavior can help target enforcement resources, regardless of
the particular good. As another example, the methodology and empirical modeling developed to
28
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ascertain consumer attitudes toward ITTP could also be applied—with new data, of course—to other
areas of unlawful conduct by consumers. The predicted consumer responses to changes in the legality of
other goods (e.g., pharmaceuticals sold online, marijuana, certain types of firearms, etc.) can help
policymakers predict and plan for enforcement against attempted circumvention. Finally, the last
research task of develop an encompassing theoretical framework for value determination in black
markets would have obvious benefits for evaluation of policy in the area of cocaine, heroin,
methamphetamine, and other illicit drug markets.
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